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On the Shannon Cipher System With a Wiretapper
Guessing Subject to Distortion and Reliability
Requirements∗
Evgueni A. Haroutunian, Associate Member, IEEE
Abstract - In this paper we discuss the processes in the Shannon cipher system with discrete
memoryless source and a guessing wiretapper. The wiretapper observes a cryptogram of N -
vector of ciphered messages in the public channel and tries to guess successively the vector of
messages within given distortion level ∆ and small probability of error less than exp{−NE}
with positive reliability index E. The security of the system is measured by the expected
number of guesses which wiretapper needs for the approximate reconstruction of the vector of
source messages. The distortion, the reliability criteria and the possibility of upper limiting
the number of guesses extend the approach studied by Merhav and Arikan. A single-letter
characterization is given for the region of pairs (RL, R) (of the rate RL of the maximum number
of guesses L(N) and the rate R of the average number of guesses) in dependence on key rate
RK , distortion level ∆ and reliability E.
Index Terms — Cryptanalysis, guessing, wiretapper, source coding with fidelity criterion,
rate-distortion theory, rate-reliability-distortion dependence, Shannon cipher system.
I. Introduction
We investigate the procedure of wiretapper’s guessing with respect to fidelity and reliability
criteria in the Shannon cipher system (see Fig. 1) [29].
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Fig. 1. The Shannon cipher system with a guessing wiretapper.
Encrypted vector of messages of a discrete memoryless stationary source must be transmit-
ted via a public channel to a legitimate receiver. The key-vector is communicated to encrypter
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and to decrypter by special secure channel protected against wiretappers. After ciphering the
vector of source messages by a key-vector, the cryptogram is sent over a public channel to a
legitimate receiver, which can recover the original message on the base of the cryptogram and
the same key-vector. A wiretapper that eavesdrops a public channel aims to decrypt the source
messages on the base of cryptogram, within the framework of given distortion and reliability,
knowing the source statistics and the encryption function but not the key. The wiretapper
makes sequential guesses (suppositions), each time applying a testing mechanism by which he
can learn whether the estimate is successful (is within a given distortion level). He stops if the
answer is affirmative, or the number of guesses attains the prescribed limit. The restriction
of the number of guesses is justified because it often happens that when some time passes the
task of guessing loses its actuality or even the sense.
The guessing problem was first considered by Massey [25], then by Arikan [3] and recently
by Malone and Sullivan [22]. The guessing subject to fidelity criterion was studied by Arikan
and Merhav in [4], [5], for reliability criterion by Haroutunian and Ghazaryan in [10], for the
Shannon cipher system with exact reconstruction of messages by wiretapper by Merhav and
Arikan in [26] and by Hayashi and Yamamoto in [20]. The Shannon cipher system with wire-
tapper reconstructing source messages subject to fidelity criterion was examined by Yamamoto
in [31]. We study a combination of these problems with additional reliability criterion and re-
striction of the number of guesses by a limit L(N) (less or equal to the number of all messages
in XN). The Shannon’s rate-distortion concept generalization, introduced by Haroutunian and
Mekoush [15], consists in studying the rate-reliability-distortion dependence. We use the term
reliability instead of the longer term error probability exponent. Applications of the reliability
criterion ware investigated for various multiterminal systems (see [10], [13] – [18], [23], [30]).
The security of the cipher system we measure by the expected number of guesses needed for
reconstruction of the source messages. That approach was used also by Merhav and Arikan in
[26] and earlier by Hellman in [21] and by Sgarro in [27], [28]. But we characterize the activity
of the system also by the rate of the maximum number of wiretapper guesses, the distortion
level of the approximate reconstruction of messages and the value of the reliability (exponent)
E in the upper estimate exp{−NE} of the probability of error of the wiretapper.
The objective of this paper is investigation of the optimal correlations of noted characteris-
tics of the described model. Abstracts of results of the paper were published in [11], [12].
II. Definitions
We pass to detailed definitions. The discrete memoryless source is defined as a sequence
{Xi}
∞
i=1 of discrete, independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables (RVs) X
taking values in the finite set X of messages x of the source. Let
P ∗ = {P ∗(x), x ∈ X}
be the source messages generating probability distribution (PD) which is supposed to be known
also to the wiretapper. Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , XN) be a random N -vector. Since we study the
memoryless source the probability of the vector x = (x1, . . . , xN ), a realization of the random
N -vector X, is
P ∗N(x) =
N∏
n=1
P ∗N(xn).
The key-source {U} is given by a sequence {Ui}
∞
i=1 of binary i.i.d. RVs, which take values from
the set U = {0, 1}. The distribution P ∗1 = {1/2, 1/2} is the PD of the key bits. The key-vector
u = (u1, u2, . . . , uK) is a vector of K bits and P
∗K
1 (u) = 2
−K . Let U = (U1, U2, . . . , UK) be a
key-vector of K binary RVs independent of the vector X.
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Denote by xˆ values of RV Xˆ representing the wiretapper reconstruction of the source message
with values in the finite wiretapper’s reproduction alphabet Xˆ , in general different from X .
Correspondingly, by XN and XˆN we denote the N -th order Cartesian powers of the sets X
and Xˆ , by UK – the K-th order Cartesian power of the set U .
We consider a single-letter distortion measure between source and wiretapper reproduction
messages:
d : X × Xˆ → [0;∞) .
It is supposed that for every x∈X there exists at least one xˆ ∈ Xˆ such that d(x, xˆ) = 0. The
distortion measure between a source vector x ∈ XN and a wiretapper reproduction vector
xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, ..., xˆN) ∈ Xˆ
N is defined as an average of the corresponding component distortions:
d(x, xˆ) = N−1
N∑
n=1
d(xn, xˆn). (1)
Let
fN : X
N × UK →W(N,K)
be an encryption function with the set W(N,K) of all possible for this N and K cryptograms
w. This function is assumed to be invertible providing the key is given , i. e. there exists the
decryption function
f−1N :W(N,K)× U
K → XN .
We denote by W (N,K) the RV with values w. For each cryptogram w = fN (x,u) the ordered
list of sequential guesses of the wiretapper
GN(w)
△
= {xˆ1(w), xˆ2(w), . . . , xˆL(N)(w)}, xˆl(w) ∈ Xˆ
N , l = 1, 2, . . . , L(N),
with the limit of the number of guesses L(N) ≤ |Xˆ |N , is called the guessing strategy of the
wiretapper. For a given guessing strategy GN (w), w ∈ W(N,K), we name guessing function
and denote by GN(x, w) the function
GN : X
N ×W(N,K)→ {1, 2, 3, . . . , L(N), L(N) + 1},
which shows index l of the first successful guessing vector xˆl(w) ∈ GN (w), i. e. such minimal l
that d(x, xˆl(w)) ≤ ∆. In other words l is the quantity of sequential guesses of the wiretapper
until the successful estimate xˆl(w) of the source vector x ∈ X
N is found. GN(x, w) equals
L(N) + 1 if the guessing is stopped after L(N) unsuccessful attempts.
For each distortion level ∆ ≥ 0, a positive number L(N) and a guessing strategy GN(w) let
us consider two sets of vectors x of messages:
the first is the set of those x which can be successfully deciphered by the wiretapper within
L(N) guessing attempts for every key u
A(w)
△
= A(L(N),GN(w),∆)
△
= {x : ∀u, ∃l ≤ L(N), fN(x,u) = w, d(x, xˆl(w)) ≤ ∆}
= {x : GN (x, w) ≤ L(N)},
and the other with those x, which can not be deciphered by the wiretapper with necessary
precision after L(N) guesses
A(w)
△
= {x : ∃u, ∀l ≤ L(N), fN(x,u) = w, d(x, xˆl(w)) > ∆}
3
= XN −A(w) = {x : ∃u, fN(x,u) = w, GN(x, w) = L(N) + 1}.
Respectively, the probability of the wiretapper error (probability of unsuccessful guessing) will
be defined for each w and ∆ as
e(L(N),GN (w),∆)
△
= 1− P ∗N (A(w)) = P ∗N
(
A(w)
)
.
Just as in other problems of information theory [18] we study the exponential decrease by N
of the error probability with given reliability (exponent) E. With E → 0 we can obtain also
results corresponding to the case of error probability upper limited by given small ε > 0 not
decreasing exponentially by N .
In this paper log-s and exp-s are taken to the base 2.
Let RK be the key rate:
RK = N
−1 log 2K = K/N.
It is supposed that L(N) also increases exponentially by N . The guessing rates pair RL, R
will be called (from the point of view of cryptanalysis, i.e. the wiretapper) (RK , E,∆)-achievable
for given E > 0, ∆ ≥ 0 and RK , if for every encryption function fN there exists a sequence of
guessing strategies GN(w) such that
lim inf
N→∞
N−1 logL(N) = RL, (2)
lim inf
N→∞
N−1 log EP ∗,P ∗1 {GN(X,W )} = R, (3)
and for all w ∈ W(N,K)
e(L(N),GN (w),∆) ≤ exp{−NE}. (4)
Let us denote by RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆) the set of all (RK , E,∆)-achievable (for wiretapper) pairs
of guessing rates RL, R and call it the guessingrates-keyrate-reliability-distortion region. The
boundary of the region RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆) we will designate by RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆). It contains
information on interdependence of extremal values of rates R and RL, so it will be convenient
to conditionally name it guessingrate-keyrate-reliability-distortion function.
The knowledge of such functional dependence is practically useful because it gives possibility
to ameliorate the security of the cipher system by increasing of the key rate RK , or by decreasing
of the number of allowed guesses L(N).
In case E →∞, X ≡ Xˆ , ∆ = 0, and RL = log |X | guessingrate-keyrate-reliability-distortion
function becomes the guessingrate-keyrate function RG(P
∗, RK) studied by Merhav and Arikan
in [26]. A problem studied by Yamamoto in the framework of the rate-distortion theory for
Shannon cipher system [31] corresponds to the case L(N) = 1 with measuring of the security
of the system by the attainable minimum distortion.
Let P = {P (x), x ∈ X} be a PD on X and Q = {Q(xˆ | x), x ∈ X , xˆ ∈ Xˆ} be a conditional
PD on Xˆ for given x, also we denote by PQ the marginal PD on Xˆ :
PQ
△
= {PQ(xˆ) =
∑
x
P (x)Q(xˆ | x), xˆ ∈ Xˆ}.
For given x ∈ X denote by QP (xˆ | x) the conditional PD on Xˆ such that for each ∆ the
following condition is fulfilled: EP,QP d(X, Xˆ)
△
=
∑
x
P (x)QP (xˆ | x)d(x, xˆ) ≤ ∆.
Let M(P,∆) be the set of all PDs QP for given ∆ and P .
We use the following notations for entropy, information and divergence:
HP (X)
△
= −
∑
x
P (x) logP (x),
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IP,Q(X ∧ Xˆ)
△
=
∑
x,xˆ
P (x)Q(xˆ | x) log
Q(xˆ | x)∑
x
P (x)Q(xˆ | x)
,
D(P ||P ∗)
△
=
∑
x
P (x) log
P (x)
P ∗(x)
.
For given E > 0 consider the following set of PDs P “surrounding” the generating PD P ∗:
α (P ∗, E)
△
= {P : D(P ||P ∗) ≤ E}. (5)
We denote by R(P,∆) the rate-distortion function for PD P (see [6], [8]):
R(P,∆)
△
= min
QP∈M(P,∆)
IP,QP (X ∧ Xˆ), (6)
and by R(P ∗, E,∆) the rate-reliability-distortion function (introduced in [15]): for source with
generating PD of messages P ∗
R(P ∗, E,∆)
△
= max
P∈α(P ∗,E)
R(P,∆). (7)
The first emergence of R(P ∗, E,∆) may be explained by Theorem 2 below. But we apply it to
solving of the problem under consideration.
In the next Section we formulate a theorem specifying the guessingrates-keyrate-reliability-
distortion region RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆). The proofs are exposed in Section IV.
III. Formulation of the Result
The main result of the paper is the complete characterization of the guessingrates-keyrate-
reliability-distortion region RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆). We introduce the following region:
R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆)
△
= {(RL, R) :
log |X | ≥ RL ≥ min(RK , R(P
∗, E,∆)), (8)
RL ≥ R ≥ max
P∈α(P ∗,E)
[min(RK , R(P,∆))−D(P ||P
∗)]}. (9)
Fig.2. Schematic diagram of region R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆).
Theorem 1: For given PD P ∗ on X , every key rate RK ≥ 0, reliability E > 0, and permissible
distortion level ∆ ≥ 0,
RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆) = R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆). (10)
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Theorem 1 comprises the following important particular cases. Denote by R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆)
the boundary of the region R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆).
Corollary 1: When E →∞, and the strategy permits the total exhaustion of the wiretapper
reproduction vectors set (RL = log |X |) we get a solution of the problem suggested by Merhav
and Arikan [26], concerning the reconstruction of the N -vector of messages by wiretapper within
an allowed level ∆ of distortion from the true vector
lim
E→∞, RL=log|X |
RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆)
= lim
E→∞, RL=log|X |
R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆)
= max
P
[min(RK , R(P,∆))−D(P ||P
∗)].
Corollary 2: When E → ∞, X ≡ Xˆ , ∆ = 0, i.e. the wiretapper requires only the exact
reconstruction of sequences of source messages, and RL = log |X |, we arrive at the result of
Merhav and Arikan from [26]:
lim
E→∞, ∆=0, RL=log|X |
RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆) = max
P
[min(RK , HP (X))−D(P ||P
∗)].
Corollary 3: When E → 0 we find that
lim
E→0
R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆) = {(RL, R) :
RL ≥ min(RK , R(P
∗,∆)),
R ≥ min(RK , R(P
∗,∆))}.
This means that when the error probability decays by N not exponentially the maximal number
of guesses may be greater than the average number of guesses only by a factor which does not
grow exponentially by N .
Explicit expressions of the guessingrate-keyrate-reliability-distortion function for particu-
lar case of binary source and Hamming distortion measure are presented together with some
diagrams in [17].
IV. Proof of Theorem 1
The first part of this Section will be appropriated to preliminary necessary known results
and tools. We apply the method of types (see [7]–[9]) in the proof of the theorem so let us
begin with the formulation of some basic concepts, notations and relations of this method.
The type P of a vector x ∈ XN is a PD P = {P (x) = N(x|x)/N, x ∈ X}, where N(x|x) is
the number of repetitions of symbol x among x1, . . . , xN . The set of all PD-s P on X , which
are types of vectors from XN for given N , we denote by P(X , N). The set of vectors x of type
P will be denoted by T NP (X) and also called the type.
Let N(x, xˆ | x, xˆ) be the number of repetitions of the pair (x, xˆ) in the pair of vectors (x, xˆ).
The conditional type of xˆ for given x from T NP (X) is conditional PD Q = {Q(xˆ|x), x ∈ X , xˆ ∈
Xˆ} such that N(x, xˆ|x, xˆ) = N(x|x)Q(xˆ|x) = NP (x)Q(xˆ|x) for x ∈ X , xˆ ∈ Xˆ . The set of all
vectors xˆ ∈ XˆN of the conditional type Q for given x ∈ T NP (X) is denoted by T
N
P,Q(Xˆ|x). The
set of possible conditional types Q for all x of the type P is denoted by Q(Xˆ , P,N).
We use the following well known properties of types ([7]–[9]):
|P(X , N)| < (N + 1)|X |, (11)
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and for each PD P ′ on X
(N + 1)−|X | exp{−ND(P ||P ′)} < P ′N(T NP (X)) ≤ exp{−ND(P ||P
′)}. (12)
It turns out (as coming discussion shows) that the described guessing problem is substan-
tially interconnected with the problem of source lossy coding subject to distortion and reliability
criteria. The latter, according to [15], as well as further works [14], [19], treats the Shannon
rate-distortion coding in view of the error probability exponential decay with exponent E. This
implies a more general optimal relation, rate-reliability-distortion one R(P ∗, E,∆) between the
coding parameters instead of the rate-distortion function R(P ∗,∆).
x˜x fc(x)✲Source ✲ Encoder
fc
Decoder
gc
✲ Receiver
Fig. 3. The source lossy coding system.
For more details, let
fc : X
N → {1, 2, · · · , C(N)}
be an encoding mapping for source N -vectors with C(N) standing for the volume of the code.
A backward mapping as a decoder of source messages
gc : {1, 2, · · · , C(N)} → Xˆ
N
is functioning with the encoder in a way to enable the probability of error for N large enough
be restricted as follows:
e(fc, gc,∆)
△
=
∑
x∈XN
P ∗N{x : d (x, gc(fc(x))) > ∆} ≤ exp{−NE}, (13)
where d (x, gc(fc(x))) is distortion between transmitted source vector x and its reconstruction
gc(fc(x)). This distortion d we supposed to be identical to defined in (1)
For a predefined pair ∆ ≥ 0 and E > 0 the rate-reliability-distortion function R(P ∗, E,∆)
specifies the minimum achievable code rate R ≥ 0 as a number to satisfy the inequality
N−1 logC(N) ≤ R + ε (where ε > 0 is arbitrarily chosen beforehand) for every code (fc, gc),
which validates (13) kept N appropriately large.
The analytics for R(P ∗, E,∆) is given by the following theorem – a result constituting the
inverse to the Marton’s exponent function from [24].
Theorem 2 [15]: For every E > 0, ∆ ≥ 0 and ε > 0, δ > 0 there exists a sequence of such
N -length block codes (fc, gc) for source with alphabet X , generating PD P
∗, and reproduction
alphabet Xˆ that whenever N ≥ N0(|X |, ε, δ), then
e(fc, gc,∆) ≤ exp{−N(E + δ)}
and
N −1 log C(N) ≤ R(P ∗, E,∆) + ε
with R(P ∗, E,∆) defined in (6), (7).
Conversely, for every sequence of codes satisfying (13) the volume C(N) cannot be too
small:
lim inf
N→∞
N −1 log C(N) ≥ R(P ∗, E,∆).
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Theorem 2 is exposed with detailed proof in [18]. The derivation of Theorem 2 can be also
observed from a more general result in [14] on robust descriptions system by eliminating all the
encoders except one. We only note here that the proof is based on a random coding lemma
about covering of types of vectors, which is a modification of the covering lemmas from [1], [2],
[8], [10], [14], [16].
The proof of the following Proposition, which we have intention to apply in solution of our
guessing problem and which concerns with coding of the vectors x of a separate type P can
constitute the essential part of the proof of Theorem 2.
Proposition: For each given type P ∈ P(X , N), every x ∈ T NP (X), ∆ ≥ 0, arbitrary ε > 0
and N ≥ N0(P, ε) there exists a sequence of such N -block codes (fc,P , gc,P ) of a volume C(P,N),
that d(x, gc,P (fc,P (x))) ≤∆ with
N −1 log C(P,N) ≤ R(P,∆) + ε,
where R(P,∆) is defined in (6) and, conversely, for every such code
lim inf
N→∞
N −1 log C(P,N) ≥ R(P,∆).
We are ready now to proceed to the proof of Theorem 1. We intend to prove that for every
RK > 0, E > 0, ∆ > 0 the following inclusions are valid
RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆) ⊇ R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆) ⊇ RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆), (14)
from where (10) follows.
The first inclusion in (13) is the converse kind statement from the viewpoint of the security
of the system and the direct statement from the point of view of cryptanalysis. We have to
prove that there exists a guessing strategy the parameters RL, R of which meet conditions (8)
and (9).
Now to prove the first inclusion in (14) consider a guessing strategy that ignores the cryp-
togram. Represent XN as a union of vectors of various types
XN =
⋃
P∈P(X ,N)
T NP (X).
We frequently consider without additional mentioning PDs P from P(X , N), which are
types for given N . When N → ∞ these types converge to the corresponding arbitrary PD-s
from P(X ).
Based on the positive assertion of the Proposition independently of a received w the wire-
tapper can consider the collection of all possible decoding vectors as the guessing strategy for
x ∈ T NP (X)
GN (w) = {xˆ1(w), xˆ2(w), . . . , xˆC(N,P )(w)}.
Using the right inequality in (12) and definition (5) of the set α(P ∗, E) we can bound above
the probability of appearance of the source sequences of types P beyond α(P ∗, E+ δ) for some
δ > 0 and N large enough as follows:
P ∗N(
⋃
P /∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
T NP (X)) ≤ (N + 1)
|X | exp{−N min
P /∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
D(P ||P ∗)}
≤ exp{−NE −Nδ + |X | log(N + 1)} ≤ exp{−NE}.
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Therefore, to obtain the desired low level of e(L(N),GN (w),∆) it is sufficient that wiretapper
constructs the guessing strategy GN (w) only for vectors of types P from α(P
∗, E + δ).
We now pass to construction of such strategy. It is possible to enumerate types P from
α(P ∗, E + δ) as P1, P2, . . . , P|α(P ∗,E+δ)| according to nondecreasing values of corresponding
rate-distortion functions R(Pi,∆) (for the sake of expressions simplicity we shall write only i
instead of Pi in R(i,∆), T
N
i (X) and so on):
R(1,∆) ≤ R(2,∆) ≤ . . . ≤ R(|α(P ∗, E + δ)|,∆). (15)
We designate by Qmini such conditional PD from M(i,∆) that (see (6) and (15))
C(i, N) = exp{N( min
Qi∈M(i,∆)
Ii,Qi(X ∧ Xˆ) + ε)} = exp{N(R(i,∆) + ε)}.
Let for fixed i the set {xˆi,m ∈ T
N
i,Qmin
i
(Xˆ), m = 1, ..., C(i, N)} be such a collection of decoding
vectors that, according to the Proposition, for N large enough the set
{x : x ∈ T N
i,Qmin
i
(X | xˆi,m), fc,i(x) = m, m = 1, ..., C(i, N)},
be a code for T Ni (X). Let us consider the following guessing strategy ignoring the cryptogram
w:
G∗N(w)
△
= {{xˆ1,m, m = 1, ..., C(1, N)}, ..., {xˆL(N,P ),m, m = 1, ..., C(L(N,P ), N)}.
The number of required guesses G∗N(x, w) for x ∈ T
N
i (X), Pi ∈ α(P
∗, E + δ) and for each
w is upper bounded for N large enough (see (6) and (15))
G∗N(x, w) ≤ C(i, N) ≤ exp{N(R(i,∆) + ε)},
and due to (7) for every x of type P from α(P ∗, E + δ) independently of w (independently of
u):
G∗N(x, w) ≤ (N + 1)
|X | exp{N( max
Pi∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
R(i,∆) + ε)} ≤ exp{N(R(P ∗, E + δ,∆) + 2ε)}.
Sometimes, especially when ∆ = 0, or RK is small, it may be appropriate for the wiretapper
to carry out the key-search attack :
G∗∗N (w)
△
= {f−1N (w,u1), f
−1
N (w,u2), . . . , f
−1
N (w,u2K )},
where u1, u2, . . ., u2K is an arbitrary numbering of all key-vectors of length K. Therefore, for
any given cryptogram w, the number of required guesses G∗∗N (x, w) is upper bounded by the
number of all key-vectors
G∗∗N (x, w) ≤ expK = exp{NRK}.
This strategy gives to the wiretapper the exact xˆ = x with the error probability equal to 0,
but it remains to note that for each x ∈ T NP (X) when RK ≥ R(P,∆) there is no sense to guess
key-vector u. That is why in that case the wiretapper may ignore w.
When exp{−K} > exp{−NE} (the probability of each possible key is greater than the
desirable error probability) the wiretapper has to test all expK keys, that is in this case
RL = RK , and E =∞. The average rate R is defined from the equality
R = lim
N→∞
N−1 log[2−1(exp{NRL}+ 1)].
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Thus, it follows that in the present instance
R = RL = RK , (16)
hence (8), (9) and left inclusion in (14) are in force.
If
exp{−NE} ≥ exp{−K} = exp{−NRK}
the wiretapper can examine fewer than expK keys. S/he can guess successively with such rate
of maximum number of guesses RL that
exp{NRL} exp{−NRK} ≥ 1− exp{−NE}.
Consequently for any small ε > 0 and sufficiently large N
exp{NRL} ≥ exp{NRK}{1− exp{−NE}} ≥ exp{N(RK − ε)}.
With the inequality RK ≥ RL, evident for the key searching, we obtain that in this case again
RL = RK . But if the wiretapper tests exp{NRK} keys then the average number of guesses
again is equal to 2−1(exp{NRK}+ 1). It means that (16) is valid and (14) holds.
Combining these two guessing strategies as G∗∗∗N (w), when strategy G
∗
N(w), or G
∗∗
N (w) with
the least number of guesses is applied, we conclude that for a given cryptogram w the number
of sequential wiretapper guesses for the source vector x ∈ T Ni (X), Pi ∈ α(P
∗, E + δ), for N
large enough is upper bounded as follows
G∗∗∗N (x, w) ≤ min{expK, exp{N(R(i,∆) + ε)} = exp{N min (RK , R(i,∆) + ε)}.
Hence, for N large enough, (see (7)) the required decrease of error probability is attainable by
the wiretapper if
L(N) ≤ max
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
exp{N min(RK , R(i,∆) + ε)}
= exp{N min (RK , R(P
∗, E + δ,∆) + ε)}.
Taking into account the independence of appearing of key-vectors and source message vectors
and using (12) and (11), we can derive for N large enough the upper estimate for the average
number of guesses:
EP ∗,P ∗1 {G
∗∗∗
N (X,W )}
=
∑
u∈UK
P ∗K1 (u)
∑
i:Pi∈α(P ∗, E+δ)∩P(X ,N)
∑
x∈T N
i
(X)
P ∗N(x)G∗∗∗N (x, fN(x,u))
≤
∑
u∈UK
P ∗K1 (u)
∑
P∈α(P ∗, E+δ)∩P(X ,N)
∑
x∈T N
P
(X)
P ∗N(x) exp{N min (RK , R(P,∆) + ε)}
=
∑
P∈α(P ∗, E+δ)∩P(X ,N)
exp{N min (RK , R(P,∆) + ε)}
∑
x∈T N
P
(X)
P ∗N(x)
=
∑
P∈α(P ∗, E+δ)∩P(X ,N)
exp{N min (RK , R(P,∆) + ε)}P
∗N(T NP (X))
≤
∑
P∈α(P ∗, E+δ)∩P(X ,N)
exp{N(−D(P ||P ∗) + min (RK , R(P,∆) + ε))}
≤ max
P∈α(P ∗, E+δ)
exp{N(−D(P ||P ∗) + min (RK , R(P,∆) + 2ε))}
= exp{N max
P∈α(P ∗, E+δ)
(−D(P ||P ∗) + min (RK , R(P,∆) + 2ε))}.
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Therefore there exists a guessing strategy the rates of which RL, R meet the inequalities
RL ≤ min (RK , R(P
∗, E + δ,∆) + ε) , (17)
R ≤ max
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
(−D(P ||P ∗) + min (RK , R(P,∆) + 2ε)). (18)
The pairs of values in right hand side correspond to the points in region R˜G(P
∗, RK , E+δ,∆), it
means that all points from R˜G(P
∗, RK , E+δ,∆) will be (RK , E+δ,∆)-achievable for wiretapper
as well. Since ε and δ can be made arbitrarily small and all present expressions are continuous
in E, we can consider arbitrary PDs P in (17) and (18) and thus obtain the left inclusion in
(14).
Now we will prove the right inclusion in (14)
R˜G(P
∗, RK , E,∆) ⊇ RG(P
∗, RK , E,∆).
To prove this it is necessary to show that rates RL and R of every guessing strategy with
keyrate Rk, reliability E, and distortion level ∆ for arbitrary encryption algorithm must meet
the right inequalities, correspondingly, in (8) and (9). This is a converse statement from the
point of view of cryptographer.
It is supposed that the wiretapper knows algorithms of ciphering and deciphering. We may
assume also that the guesser knows the type P of the source message x, for such an informed
guesser any lower bounds on L(N) and EP ∗,P ∗
K
{G∗N(X,W )} are lower bounds for uninformed
guesser too.
For each type P the principal is the relation of two numbers: NRK = K < NR(P,∆),
or K ≥ NR(P,∆). In the first occasion the key search is preferable for the wiretapper, in
the second situation s/he can guess ignoring the cryptogram. In fact the wiretapper uses
cryptogram w only after guessing of key-vector u.
Let us start with the case
RK < R(P,∆). (19)
Denote by G˜N (w, P ) a guessing strategy of the wiretapper that for any encryption function
guarantees small error probability: e(L(N), G˜N (w, P ),∆) ≤ exp{−NE}. Regardless the source
probability distribution the optimal guessing strategy under the condition (19) is the key-search
attack. The wiretapper can then find the exact x applying description function f−1N on the key
vector and w. Of course it is supposed that guessing of the exact x is also acceptable for
the wiretapper. We already know that in this case the minimum values for R and RL meet
inequalities (8), (9).
Now let us consider the best strategy when P ∈ α(P ∗, E + δ) and
expK ≥ exp{NR(P,∆)}. (20)
We also know that when Rk ≥ R(P,∆) the wiretapper can guess each x ∈ T
N
P (X) with dis-
tortion ∆ and error probability less than exp{−NE} using less than exp{NR(P,∆)} guesses,
so key-search as demanding longer work is not preferable. The question is: does another
guessing strategy with less than exp{NR(P,∆)} guesses exist? But every guessing strategy
{xˆ1(w), xˆ2(w), . . . , xˆL(N,P )(w)} ignoring w may be considered as a list for the source encod-
ing satisfying distortion and reliability criteria, so according to the converse statement of the
Proposition for N large enough L(N,P ) cannot be taken less than exp{NR(P,∆)}.
Thus the numbers less than exp{N min(RK , R(P,∆))} cannot be considered as limit L(N,P ),
and for the common guessing strategy inequality (8) is in force.
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By averaging we obtain lower estimate for the expected number of guesses:
EP ∗,P ∗1 {GN(X,W}
= EP ∗1 {EP ∗{GN(X,W )}}
≥
∑
u∈UK
P ∗K1 (u)
∑
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
∑
x∈T N
P
(X)
P ∗N(x)GN(x, w)
≥
∑
u∈UK
P ∗K1 (u)
∑
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
∑
x∈T N
P
(X)
⋂
A(w)
P ∗N(x)GN(x, w)
=
∑
u∈UK
P ∗K1 (u)
∑
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
P ∗N(A(w))P ∗N
(
T NP (X)
)
×
max
x∈TN
P
(X)
⋂
A(w)
GN (x,w)
∑
l=1
lPr{xˆl(w) | x ∈ T
N
P (X)
⋂
A(w)}
≥
∑
u∈UK
P ∗K1 (u)
∑
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
(1− exp{−NE}) exp{−ND(P ‖ P ∗)}
× exp{N(min(RK , min
QP∈M(P,∆)
IP,QP (X ∧ Xˆ)− ε))}
≥ exp{N max
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
(min(RK , R(P,∆)−D(P ‖ P
∗)− 2ε))}.
In this calculation P is type, but with growing of N it approaches arbitrary PD P . Hence for
N large enough
RL ≥ N
−1 logL(N)− ε ≥ min(RK − ε, R(P
∗, E + δ,∆)− 2ε),
R ≥ N−1 log EP ∗P ∗1 {GN(X,W )} − ε
≥ max
P∈α(P ∗,E+δ)
(min(RK , R(P,∆))−D(P ‖ P
∗)− 2ε).
Granting arbitrariness of ε and ∆ we obtain (8) and (9).
It rest to remark that comparison of cases (19) and (20) shows that in condition (19) it is
not possible to guess with ∆ 6= 0 and have smaller number of guesses, because approximate
guessing will need more than exp{NR(P,∆)} guesses, i. e. more than exp{NRK}, which is
enough for the exact reconstruction.
Therefore the proof of the right inclusion in (14) is completed.
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